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I. INTRODUCTION 
The pre-Socratic thinkers tried to explain reality 
by what they saw around them, and their attempts were admirable 
however naive. Heraclitus with his constant tlux and Parmeni-
des with his immutable one indicate the extremes to which their 
speculations went. They were physicists and, as such, they 
wanted a theory ot reality which would explain everything ma-
terially. Anaxagoras, whom the Stagirite describes as the only 
sober man among the early philosophers, was the first to pos-
tulate mind in the world. It was Aristotle himself who, with 
his doctrine of potency and act, pOinted out that there could 
be both one and many in nature. He exposed the limitations ot 
his predecessors and synthesised the truths contributed by all 
ot them. 
Curiously enough, we are facing today in our enlight-
ened age a situation not altogether unlike the epoch before 
Socrates. Modern science has taken over the ph11osophical 
tield and the new physics claims to have explained the universe 
Having discredited both metaphysics and teleology, conscious 
and intelligent design is disdained as hopelessly obsolete! 
In tact, any explanation of reality which is not evolutionary 
rITeleology,' article by Wm. Fulton, BAstings Encyclopedia ot 
Religion and Ethics, Vol. 12, p. 224, N. Y.; 1922. cit. Mar-
ling, the Order ot Nature in the Philosophy of St. thomAs 
AqUinas, p. 155. 
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is disregarded and stands very little chance of receiving recog-
nition. Notwithstanding the facts that for many centuries the 
world acknowledged Aristotle's four causes as a scientific ex-
position of nature, contemporary thinkers have preferred the 
less perfect theories of the early Greek philosophers. 
The philosophy of events as propounded by Bertrand 
Russell, Eddington, Sir James Jeans, and the rest, is nothing 
more than the flux of Heraclitus. The mechanistic theories 
plainly revert to Democritus, although we ordinarily trace 
them only to Descartes, and Spinoza's pantheism is merely a 
spiritualized statement of Parmenides' doctrine that there is 
only one substance. 
-Modern scientists deliberately ignore the origin of 
things. Everything is in process moving from an unknown prin-
ciple to an unpredictable end or rather to no end at all. 
Eddington writes, "It may be objected that.we have no right to 
dismiss the starting-off as an inessential part of the problem 
•••• But that is •••• a problem of the pack, not of the iso-
lated oard. 12 The diffioulty that is here so nonchalantly 
passed off is very likely oaused by the fact that the majority 
of physioists refuse to admit anything but sense perception 
into their knowledge. Eddington in his introduotion to The 
Nature of the PhYsioal World illustrates this by his descrip-
tion of his scientific and familiar tables, where he attempts 
2A. S. Eddington The Nature of the PhYsical World, p. 65 
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to destroy the idea ot substance and replace it by thinghood 
which is in the order ot sense-perceptible. 
We may ask just exactly what is an event? Whitehead 
answers it is -the grasping into unity ot a pattern ot aspects~~ 
For Whitehead nature is composed ot events. For Russell, on 
the other hand, everything is one big event~ In spite ot dif-
terences ot this kind which crop out between various eventists 
they all agree that nature is a process. There are no such 
things as tinal and tormal causes. Nature does not operate tor 
an end; it merely operates. In Thomistic philosophy nature 
also operates but the writings ot Aquinas are permeated with 
the statement, -guod omne &gens agit propter tinem.- Nature 
develops and untolds in the thought ot St. Thomas as tully as it 
does in the doctrine ot any champion ot progress, but according 
to the Thomistic interpretation everything has a beginning and 
an end, and God Himselt operates in nature through the a~petitue 
naturalis to transtorm a static hierarchy ot being into a dyna-
mic ascent to Himself. 
Although teleology and causality are anathema among 
the greater number ot modern philosophers there are some con-
cessions made to them here and there. Max Planck, who intro-
duoed the quantum theory so idolized in the new physios, writes 
3Soienoe and the Modern World, p. 174. 
4Russell, Philosophy, pp. 276-291 
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"it is essential tor theheaIthy',development of physics, that 
among the postulates of this science we reckon not merely the 
existence ot law in general but also the strictly causal char-
acter ot that la •• 15 Indeed, it is absurd to aoknowledge a law 
without recognizing causality at the same time, and this is pre-
cisely what many scientists want to do. The very fact that 
they all admit natural and physical laws would indicate that 
their exclusion of causality is nominal, since they unconscious-
ly have recourse to the principles ot causality in their prac-
tical experiments. Moderns complain that the idea ot causality 
is vague and hard to grasp. This is because they consider it 
only in the light ot experience. St. Thomas did not have this 
ditticulty, tor causality was tor him a metaphysical idea and, 
as such a manner ot being he contemplated it. 
Practically all current philosophy is stamped with an 
evolutionary character. It it isoentered on anything it is 
homocentric. St. Thomas is definitely theo-centric in his 
world view, tor God is both First Cause and Final End ot all 
creatures. All things move toward Him and the appetitus natur-
alis is the reason tor this movement in the universe. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to study the place 
of the appetitus naturalis in Thomistic thought. It is, indeed j 
the principle in nature which 1s responsible tor the order 1n 
~Planck, the Universe 1n tge L2ght of Modern Physics, p. 84, 
cit. Marling, opus cit., p. 141. 
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the universe. Before examining this principle in particular, 
however, it is necessary to understand that St. Thomas insisted 
on finality in ·the world. All things work toward ends, and 
they do so by mesns of their va.rious appetites. From this 
standpoint, the working of things toward ends, appetites gener-
ally, and the appetitus na.turalis, as such, will be discussed. 
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II. ALL THINGS WORK TOWARD ENDS 
According to St. Thomas Hemne agens agit propter 
bonum,-l and the good is that Which all thlngs seek. A creature 
then, only desires an end ln so far as it is good, or at least 
appears to be good, for lntelllgent beings move toward a good 
through the will which desires good, as such. Irratlonal belngs 
on the other hand, must seek an end ln one of two ways: elther 
by an intelligent agent dlrecting lt or by a prlnciple put into 
lts nature by the Flrst Cause. An arrow flylng toward a target 
ls dlreoted ln its movement by the archer, but a stone falllng 
to the earth ls moved by its natural lncllnatlon, .and thls 
inclination ls an lnt~lnsic princlple placed ln the belng by the 
Creator. However, the movement by wh1chthe arrow goes to the 
target ls outside its nature and ls somewhat violent. • The 
natural necesslty lnherent in those thlngs whlch are determ1ned 
to a partlcular thing ls a klnd of impression from God direot-
lng them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow ls 
moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an lmpression 
from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a dif-
ference inasmuoh as that whlch creatures recelve from God is 
their nature, Wh1le that whioh natural things receive from man 
inaddltion to their nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as 
the violent necesslty ln the movement of the arrow shows the 
~s! C. G. III, 3 
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action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows 
the government of Divine Providence~2 
Now objects tend toward definite ends, for if they 
did not they would not do one thing rather than another. 
"Everything that tends definitely to an end, either fixes its 
own end or has its end fixed for it by another: otherwise it 
would not tend rather to this end than to that. But the oper-
ations of nature tend to definite ends."3 Such indifference 
would cancel the efficacy of activity and nothing would be pro-
duced in nature at all. Therefore, action must be directed. 
One might suppose that action is directed by chance, but if 
this were so the gains of nature would not be the rule rather 
than the exceptions and the fact that they are is apparent 
from the order in the universe. Moreover, because we do not 
see deliberation taking place we must not conclude that thereis 
no purpose. As Aristotle said, this is absurd. Art does not 
deliberate. If the shipbuilding art were in the wood, it would 
produce the same results by nature. If, therefore, it is pres-
ent in art, it is present also in nature~ It is clear, then, 
that there must bea definite purpose to an action even if the 
action is done for its own sake~ for to every act there must be 
two termini - a beginning and an end, and the end is that for 
2 3S. Theol. q.103, a.l, ad 3 
S. C. G. I, 44 
4Phls. 11, 8 , 199b 
5·S.C~Qt. III, 2 
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which the action is done. 
What is it, then, that a thing seeks? Everything 
seeks its own perfection,. and in doing so a being is tending 
to a good, for a thing is good inasmuch as it is perfect. Fur-
thermore, as a thing tends to be good it moves toward the di-
vine likeness - for God is Supreme Goodness, the Summum Bonum. 
Now a particular good is appetible because it resembles the 
First Goodness. Therefore, a thing in seeking its own good is 
seeking the divine likeness, and it tends to its own good for 
the sake of the divine likeness? Hence it follows that all 
things in reality seek the same Last End, namely, God. It is 
on this doctrine of finality that the Thomistic teleology rest& 
St. Thomas re-formulated the ideas of Aristotle on 
nature working for ends. The philosopher tells us that in na-
ture all things are conducive to ends, for an end is present in 
all things which come to be and are by nature? Although peo-
ple often discuss whether such active creatures as spiders, 
ants, etc., work by intelligence or some other faculty, still 
we see even in plants that is produced which will be for the 
sake of an end - the leaves growing to provide shade for the 
fruit, the roots growing down into the ground seeklng mOisture, 
and so forth. There ls, then, qulte evidently a cause opera-
ting in nature, and since nature means matter and form of 
which the latter ls the end of the former, and since all the 
5 7 S. C. G. III, 24 
Phys. idem, 199a 
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rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in 
the sense of that tor the sake ot which~ Here Aristotle has 
the idea of a first cause being at the same time final end, and, 
of course; in Thomism this notion becomes fundamental. 
Sphys. idem, 199a 
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III. APPETITE 
St. !homas conceives nature from two aspects: first 
as a static hierarchy ot beingf and secondly, as a dynamic 
ascent of th1s be1ng to God~ The force which converts the for-
mer into the latter 1s appetite, the tendency 1n an object to-
ward something ordained~ All th1ngs have appet1tes accord1ng 
to their vary1ng natures and all ultimately seek the Same Last 
End, God, s1nce all des1re the fulfillment 'of the1r perfect10n~ 
Although we say appetite moves things toward their ends, St. 
Thomas says it 1s not the cause of movement merely 1n the sense 
of change of place or of quality, for generation and destruction 
are movements too~ ThUS, appet1te 1s the cause of motion and 
rest 1n nature. 
Appet1te, then, 1s really des1re, the crav1ng of a 
thing to ach1eve the fulness of 1ts be1ng. Hence, appetite 1s 
a potency for someth1ng that 1s lacking 1n a being. It 1s sat-
1sfied only when the object of des1re 1s reached and the appe-
tit1ve subject 1s thus ontologically enriched. A being des1res 
~S. Theol. q.47, a3 ad 2; DeVeritate q.29, a.3 ad 3 
3s.d.G. I, 74 
DeVer1tate, q.22, a.l "1 .. ,guas1 tender§ 1n aligu1d, ad 1psum 
40rd1nantur." 
s.d.G. ttl, 16 
5In t De Anima, St. Thomas lect. 6; Sert1llanges. St. Thomas d l 
Agu1n, v.2, p.30 
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somethlng that lt lacks, slnce .1t would have no need of deslr-
lng what lt already has. However, as Sertlllanges polnts out, 
we must ln some way possess lt before we seek lt, for the good 
sought must ln some way be apprehended, as one must know a 
thlng before he can deslre It. "You would not search for me, 
lf you had not already found me.,6 From thls lt ls clear that 
there ls a relatlon between an appetlte and the degree of know~ 
edge ln the belng to Whlch lt belongs. Therefore, ln the human 
soul there are as many appetltlve powers as there are cognltlve, 
that ls two, for the soul apprehends objects by means of a sen-
sitive and an lntellectual faculty. But the power of apprehen-
sion ls distlnct from the appetltive potency for lt has not the 
characterlstlc of movement. The act of apprehendlng ls flnlsh-
ed only when the object has passed into the power apprehendlng 
lt but the appetlte completes lts funotlon by merely tendlng 
towards an objeot? 
There are three dlfferent klnds of appetlte: natura~ 
sensltlve (anlmal), and ratlonal. The natural appetlte ls that 
lncllnatlon everythlng has of lts own nature for somethlng 
sultable to ltself. But the anlmal appetlte results from the 
good apprehended~ Ratlonal appetlte ls strlctly ln the lntel-
lectual order and ls, therefore, the hlghest deslre of the 
6 Sertll1anges, opus .. clt., p. 191; St. Thomas, DeVerltate, q.22, 
7 a.l , ad 3 e t ad 4 
8 Gllson, opus cl t. pp. 285-288 
S. Theol. q. 78, a.l, ad 3 
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highest creatures in the material universe, men, truly the 
ambassadors between heaven and earth. 
When St. Thomas adopted the Aristotelian explanation 
of nature with the theory of potency and act, he marked all 
activities With the imprimatur of teleology. Even mere matter 
craves to become something and it is actualized when it re-
ceives a torm. Some inclination follows every torm~ Fire 
because of its torm is inclined to rise and beget fire in the 
bodies with which it comes in contact. Just as there is a 
h!erarchy of being in the philosophy of St. Thomas so there is 
a hierarchy ot forms, and the torms are more perfect in beings 
with knowledge than in those deVOid of it~O For in beings 
without knowledge the form determines being only to its nature. 
Hence, the natural form is followed by a natural inclination 
which is called the natural appetite;l But in the case of 
beings with knowledge the form is receptive of the species ot 
other things. Therefore, the senses can receive all things 
sensible and the intellect all things intelligible. Consequent4 
ly, the soul of man through knowledge can become all things 
since it can receive the forms of all intelligible reality. 
Since, then, all things knowable can exist in the mind of man, 
in this respect man attains to the divine likeness, for all 
9S• ~eol. q.80, a.l 
S. eol. q.80, a.l 
lS. Theol. q.80, a.l 
-13-
things pre-exist in the mind of God. Furthermore, as forms 
exist in things endowed'with knowledge in a higher way than in 
things devoid of knowledge, and since the former are superior 
to the latter, there must be in the former an inclination sur-
passing the natural appetite. This superior inclination is a 
potency of the soul through which the animal desires what it 
apprehends as well as that to which it is naturally inclined~2 
Moreover, the higher the appetite the wider will be its range, 
for the nearer a nature is to God the less it will be determin-
ed by Him and the more it will determine itself. Therefore, 
things without knowledge are merely determined b¥ their appe-
tites to particular ends; they are directed only by their nat-
ural inclinations - nothing more. Thus the arrow is directed 
and set in motion by the archer; the stone falls naturally to 
the ground}3 
Ascending from natural appetite the next step toward 
God is the sensitive appetite. Now sensuality includes two 
different potencies! the concupiscible and the irascible~ The 
natural appetite does nothing more than obey the fundamental 
precept of the natural law: seek what is suitable and avoid 
what is harmful. The sensitive does more than this. It tends 
to resist what is contrary to the suitable and what is a threat 
with the harmful!4 The coneupiscible potency is that Which 
12 138. Theol. q.80, a.l 
l4De Veritate, q.22, a.l 
In III De Anima. St. Thomas, lect. 14 
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seeks what sense perception presents as suitable and avoids 
what the senses present as harmful~5 The irascible potency is 
that which strives against what opposes the suitable or threat-
ens with the hurtful~6 These two potencies are frequently in 
opposition to each other and in this way act as a protection to 
each other, for anger lessens concupiscence, concupiscence 
anger!7 
Now just as the natural and sensual appetites are 
both present in animals, so they together with the rational 
appetite are present in man. In the beast the sensitive appe-
tite, being a potency of the soul, is subject to what is called 
the vis aestimativa, that faculty by which the sheep fears the 
wolf and the bird uses grass and twigs.to build its nest. In 
the case of man, however, the sensual appetite, belonging to 
that part of the soul wherein reside the intellect and will, is 
subject to the particular reason which St. Thomas calls the 
cogitative}8 Although sensuality is subject·to the particular 
reason, it is superior to the natural appetite since it is not 
merely determined to one object but to all that is suitable to 
it. But in man the reason must first apprehend the good in 
order to desire one object rather than another}9 
The appetitive power of the soul is passive inasmuch 
i:ln III De Anima, St. Thomas, lect. 14 
De KaloL q.8, a.3 l7%n III ve Anima. locus cit. 
lSZn II De Anima, St. Thomas, lect. 13 
19S. Theol. q.8l, a.5; De Veritate, q.25, a.2 
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as it is moved by a good apprehended?O !he rational appetite 
is moved by the universal good as opposed to the particular 
good~l Moreover, the rational appetite is active insofar as it 
is an act of the will impelling the intellect. The will, then, 
must desire what it apprehends as good by the very necessity ot 
its nature, Whioh is to desire the good?2 Therefore, the in-
tellectual appetite is different from the sensitive appetite 
because the object of intellect is different from the object ot 
sense. The reason that the will can transcend individual ends 
is that it is strictly immateria123 and is an inclination con-
sequent on the torm understood. Therefore, the will, being a 
tendency to universal good, can include all things. 
It has been pointed out that both sensitive and ra-
tional appetites are composed of two parts: The first of the 
concupiscible and irascible potencies; the second of intellect 
and will. But the natural appetite, likewise,has two manifes-
tations, namely, the active and the passive. The passive func 
tion tries to preserve the thing in nature by maintaining what 
it needs. The active operation tends to destroy whatever 
threatens the being. Furthermore, all corrupt1l:>l-e beings must 
battle victoriously against hostile elements or be destroyed 
~~In III De Anima St. Thomas, leot. 14 
22St. Theol. I-II, q.l, a.2, ad 3 
23S. Theol. q.82, a.l s. Theol. q.87, a.4 
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by them~4 Theref'ore, the active operat10n of the naturalappe-
t1te 1s h1gher than the pass1ve. Here we see carried out aga1n 
that orderly h1erarchy so fundamental 1n the Thom1st1c synthe-
s1s. There 1s a gradat10n w1th1n the appetites correspond1ng 
to the degrees of' perf'ect10n 1n the natural, sens1t1ve, and 
rat10nal 1nc11nat10ns themselves. This 1s the var1ety 1n un1-
formity which makes the very pass1ng of things 1n the un1verse 
a thing of beauty. 
To d1st1ngu1sh further the relat10n of every potency 
to its proper object, we may say that the proper object of the 
natural appet1te is th1s th1ng as such; of the sens1t1ve, this 
th1ng as su1table; and of the rational, good 1n general. Hence, 
the natural appet1te seeks merely to preserve its nature; sen-
sua11ty 1s concerned w1th a good th1ng; and rat10nal appetite 
des1res· good, as euch?5 Nevertheless, the h1gher appet1te 
moves only through the mediat10n of the lower and 1s thereby 
dependent upon the lower~6 In th1s sense, the natural appe-
tite 1s more un1versal than its super10rs s1nce 1t 1s common 
to all created th1ngs 1n so far as they ex1st at all, whereas, 
the sens1t1ve appet1te is found only 1n an1mals and man, the 
rat10nal 1n man alone. Therefore, we may say that all appet1t 
1s dependent on the appetitus natura11s and consequently this 
natural inc11nat1on must be the pr1m1t1ve mov1ng force 1n na-
~~G11S0n, locus c1t.: S. Theol. q.8l, a.2 
26 S Theol I-II, q.22 In III De An1ma, St. Thomas, lect. 15, 16 
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ture. It 1s by means of the appet1tes generally that St. Thoma I 
br1dges the ohasm between the f1n1te and the Inf1n1te. 
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IV. THE APPETITUS NATURALIS 
In treat1ng the appet1tus natura11s, as such, 1t may 
be well to consider a Lat1n phrase wh1chw8.S used by many ph1l-
osophers from the beg1nn1ng of the th1rteenth century and cul-
minated with Sp1noza 1n the Seventeenth, namely, "natura natur-
~ - natura naturata."l It is thought that this expression 
was introduced into Western Europe by the Arabian philosophers, 
particularly through the translation of Averroes' Commentary on 
Aristotle. When the Arabic wr1t1ngs were being translated the 
interpreters merely wrote the l1teral Latin word above each 
Arabic word. In the translation into Latin then natura is used 
to substitute for I» tr~s. • 
Although th1s expression appears fairly often in the 
works of the great Schoolmen of the thirteenth century it was 
not courted with great favor and St. Thomas himself uses natura 
naturata not at all and natura naturans only twice~ Moreover, 
lFor the historical background of th1s term the writer is in-
debted to an article by Henry A. Lucks, "Natura Naturans -
Natura Naturata,· The New Scholast1c1sm, v. IX, no. 1, 1935; 
also to The Order of Nature, Joseph Mar11ng, C. PP. S., ch. I, 
2. 
2Sum.Theol. I-II, q.85, a.6 "Natura v§ro un1v§rsalls est v1rtus 
act1va in a11quQ universa11 principio natura§, puta 1n aliquo 
caelestium corp o rum , vel a11cuJus super10ris substantiae, 
secundym quod et1am Deus a qu1busdam dicitur natura naturgns; 
In Dlv. Nom. 4, 21 "Est autem Deus yniversa11s causa ominum, 
quae natyra11ter flunt, unde §t gu1dem lpsum nominant 
naturentem." 
-19-
when the Scholastics use this expression at all they do so with 
a very orthodox connotation. Natura naturans clearly means God, 
the Efficient Cause in nature, and natura naturata denotes 
created nature. This is a very different interpretation indeed 
from the Pantheistic view of Spinoza when he employs the same 
terminology. 
In spite of the fact that John of St. Thomas referred 
to nat.ura naturans as a "vocabulo asperiore, ,3 the Schoolmen 
really had precedents for this distinction if not for the phrase 
itself. Scotus Eringena had analyzed -natura quae creat et non 
areatur; natura quae creatur et creat; natura quae creatur et 
non creat; natura quae nee creatur nec creat. n4 Furthermore, 
St. Augustine, the most revered authority in Christian philoso-
phy before St. Thomas, spoke of natura creatrix5 by which he 
meant what the Scholastics designated by natura naturans, God. 
~e reason that this discussion is brought in here is 
that the purposes of this thesis is to Show that the appetitus 
naturalis is the motivating force operating in natura naturata 
by ·the grace of natura naturans for the sake of establishing 
order in the universe. St. Thomas tells us that nature is seen 
to operate Wisely and that operation to be wise must be ordered 
for it is proper to wisdom that all things be disposed in order~ 
~Phil. Nat. I, P.O. IX1 Art. I, pp. 148-9, Vives Ed., Paris,18a~ De Divisione Naturae ~ib. I J No.1. Uigne P. L. 122:411 5De Trivitate, XV, d.l, n.l \.igne P.L. 42:1057) 
60puscula II Mandonnet, (Edit. Rom. XXXIV), De Operationibus 
Occultia Naturae Ad Quemdam Militem Ultra Montanum. 
r 
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When we speak of natural appetite we refer to an in-
clination inherent in a thing without being oaused by anything 
out~ide, for that is natural to a thing whioh has been put into 
it by God; and when a thing is moved naturally it is moved "~ 
interiori prinoipio. la 
The appetitus naturalis is fundamental in nature for 
it is the means by whioh things devoid of knowledge seek their 
ends. The referenoes in St. Thomas to this inherent natural 
foroe are frequent and he desoribes it in various ways. It is 
a natural neoessity, a kind of impression from God in those 
beings determined to a partioular end, direoting them to their 
end as the neoessity, whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly 
towards a cert~in point, is an impression from the aroher and 
not from the arrow~ Again St. Thomas says "the natural appe-
tite is that inclination everything has, of its own nature, for 
something suitable to itself. 110 
Now even things devoid of knowledge oan work for an 
end and desire good through the natural appetite~l But in 
working toward their end they seek both their own perfection 
and the divine likeness. Now whether a thing is seeking its 
own perfection or the divine likeness it is desiring a good -
its own particular good or the Summua Bonum. Since, therefore, 
7S. C. G., III, 100 
~St.Thos. In Phys. Arist. Lib. VIII, IV, 6 
S. Theol., q.103, a.l, ad 3 i~ibid. 1, q.7a, a.l ~G. III, 24; De Veritate q.22, q.lj S. Theol. I-II,q.l,a.2 
-2l~ 
all things are good only in so far as they participate in the 
Supreme Goodness, it follows that all things are ordered to 
that Goodness, and St. Thomas says, Homnia ordinantur in unum 
finem. qui est Deus." 12 Everything that exists at all has some 
perfection in its very being and the tendency inherent in its 
nature is to become as actualized as it can. However, being 
is either an end in and for itself or it is finalized in some 
complete being, and since God is the source of all being He 
must necessarily be the end toward which it tendst3 God, then, 
is the first cause in the order of final causes just as He is 
14 highest in the order of goods. Furthermore, all creatures 
want to become godlike, Homnia intendunt assimilari Deo. n15 
It is because of this desire implicit in all nature that in 
the hierarchy of being all higher beings are dependent upon the 
lower, yet each species having someth1ng more than its infer-
iors, by that very superiority, raises the lower above its in-
ferior level and brings it nearer to God. This is the most 
profound law of the finite - to possess the Infinite,' Hence, 
the ultimate end of all things being to become gOdlike, beings 
seek this end according to their own natures~6 It is this com-
mon desire of all creatures for God which makes the uniformity 
12 . 13S.C.G. III, 17 
O'Mahony opus cit., p.90; also Post.Anal. Lib I, lect. 13; 
l4Metaph. Lib V, lect. 3. 
I S.C.G. III, 17 
BS.C.G. III, 19 
ISS.C.G. III, 20 
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in nature; their seeking Him in the manner oonsonant with their 
individual natures gives variation to the tapestry of the uni-
verse. This is the progress which the evolutionists see in the 
world and are unable to explain. Because they fail to perceive 
or deliberat,ely ignore the fact that every action must have two 
termini - a principle and an end - they try to solve the appar-
ent difficulty of change and becoming by a theory of inevitable 
progress never to be terminated. St. Thomas was more astute 
than this. He saw God as the Alpha and the Omega of all things 
and man as the epitome of creation, through whose mediation all 
lower beings, impelled by the appetitus naturalis, attain their 
final end. 
Granted that all beings seek their ends through the 
natural appetite the question arises how is it that these par-
ticular ends sought by individual objects do not conflict? The 
stone falling into its proper plaoe in the universe; the fire 
rising to communicate its form; the seed growing into the stur-
dy plant; the egg developing into the ohicken; none of these 
interferes with the others. The Saint explains that the part 
loves the whole more than itself and therefore works harmoni-
ously with other parts for the sake of the whole!? Moreover, 
that this is so is evident from experience since we perceive in 
Hthe external finality of nature the adaptation of species to 
one another. HIS 
I'lSumrna Theol. I-II, q.I09, a.3 
18Marling, opus cit., p.62 
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We say that natural things develop in obedience to 
certain principles which scientists call natural laws. This is 
the inner order in objects to which St. Augustine refers when 
he says, IA-rno est, inquit, per quem aguntur omnia quae Deu@ 
consti tui t. !f19 Inasmuch as all beings act according to .their 
natures and seek the divine likeness, 'all creation is the ex-
pression of God's nature as it can be im1tated beyond Himself. 
Therefore, all creatures, animate and 1nanimate, act according 
to certain rules in the view of given ends. These rules we 
call the natural law, and the natural law is one manifestation 
of the eternal law by which God willed the universe. 20 Hence, 
the natural law, as such, 1s the orderly process nature follows 
in carrying on its activities and since the aHpetitus naturalis 
is the motivating force in natural objects it is the mode 
according to which irrational creatures part1c1pate in the etep 
nal law. Now St. Thomas insists ,that law is essentially rea-
sonable?l His famousdef1n1tion of law has become proverbial 
among Scholastics: it 1s a certain reasonable order for the 
common good, promulgated by one who has the authority to care 
for the commun1ty~2, Therefore, St. Thomas would inSist, law 
can be applied to the irrational universe only analogously~3 
19 20De Ordine, I, 10, 28, P.L. 32:991 
21Gilson, 0HuS c1t., p. 327 
22S. Theol. I-II, q.90, a.4; I-II, q.97, a.3 
23S. Theol. I-II, q.90 ibid. 
Marling, 0HuS cit., p. 83 
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In commenting on the Pseudo - Dionysius the Angelic Doctor, 
however, appears to ident1fy the appetitus naturalis with the 
'> 
naturales leges for he says, the very natural inclinations 
themselves which impel things to their proper ends and are con-
sonant with the effect of the natural appetite we call the nat-
ural laws?4 Furthermore, the Saint uses ~ naturae in the 
sense of ~ naturae since the order of nature follows direct-
ly from the promulgated natural laws. Also these natural laws 
are sanctioned, for if by design or accident certain irrational 
bodies are prevented from reaching their end this failure re-
sults in their destruction. Prof. Gilson says that in the 
event that certain bodies are prevented/trom meeting the re-
quirements of their nature they suffer in their substance as 
well as their operations and they are destroyed. Nor, he con-
tinues, is this either a consequence of the disorder which pre-
vents them from following their inherent tendencies or an ac-
cidental complement of this disorder. It is, on the other han 
a part of the situation in which the body is placed as a result 
of this disorder, and death or destruction of the animal of ob-
Ject so situated is the very thing that re-establishes order in 
the disorder. Moreover, since nothing can escape the law and 
everything which attempts to perishes inasmuch as it succeeds, 
the persistent being of the body that obeys the law and the 
destruction of the body that defies it is the moral sanction of 
~4In De Div. Nom., X, I 
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the natural law~5 
It has been noted that St. Thomas identifies the nat-
ural appetite with the natural law and both with the order of 
nature. Consequently, the appetitus naturalis must be the in-
trinsic cause of the harmony and regularity in nature. Since, 
then, it is God who has endowed creatures with their natural 
inclinations, He must be the extrinsic Efficient Cause in the 
universe. Here is the orthodox Scholastic conception of Natura 
Naturans - natura naturata. 
But what about the case of miracles? In this case 
would the natural appetite be destroyed if it were thus impeded 
from its natural effect? St. Thomas says it is very difficult 
to oppose the laws of nature~6 But in the Summa Contra Gentites 
IV, 55, he says it is proper to God to change the laws of natura 
~at happens in a miracle? God merely suspends the natural laws. 
~rue, this suspension would prevent the natural appetite from 
!having its effect but it would in no way destroy or impair that 
~ppetite itself, for its destructio~ would be that of its very 
~ature. Moreover, miracles illustrate a higher law than that of 
the relative, na~ely, the metaphysical dependence of the finite 
on the Infinite Who transcends the relations of contingency 
~ound on the plane of the re1ative~7 
~5 
. ~6Gi1son, opus cit., p. 331 
b7In II Sent., d.9, q.1, a.3 
~ O'Mahony, opus cit., p. 87 
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From the lowest creature in which matter desires form 
to the highest which sees God Himself, an overwhelming urge 
permeates nature and makes it go of itself to God. The~­
titus naturalis, therefore, is the divine dynamo 10 the ascent 
of being. Now God is the first desire of all beings because 
they love Him~8 It is an Augustinian idea that it is love 
which makes the stone, for example, fall into its proper place 
in the universe, for love is a tendency towards an object de-
sired. Nevertheless, this is also a Thomistic notion, for 
Aqui~as says God is the first desire of all things~9 
God created the universe freely and essences are the 
gratuitous gifts of the Divine Goodness. In this sense nature 
is an overflow of the Divine Love~O Moreover, God did not 
merely create beings and then abandon them. He preserves them 
and cares for them by His Divine Providence which is shown by 
the natural necessity of things~l Furthermore, St. Thomas says 
lit belongs to the Divine Goodness, as it brought things into 
eXistence, so to lead them to their end: and this is to gov-
ern. 132 Although God created the world through His Love, wish-
ing thereby to communicate His Own goodness, He did not give up 
28S. Theol. I-II, q.109, a.3 
29S.C.G. I, 37 
30This is only apparently similar to the neo~Platonic doctrine 
, of emanation, for creation was an act of God's free will and 
3lwhat He created is essentially distinct from Himself. 
2S. Theol., q.103, a.l, ad 3 
3 S. Theol., q.103, a.l 
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anything of Himself in the sense of losing anything when He en-
dowed beings with their individual natures. Creatures did, on 
the other hand, acquire their essence and existence from Him. 
Therefore, what God put 1nto beings essent1ally was a love of 
Himself which would move them to seek Him Who loved them first. 
This progress toward unity so manifest in the universe is 
caused by the love of God 1nscribed in creatures, and the 
Angelic Doctor tells us, "In aDpet1tu autem naturali princ1pium 
hu'usmodi motus est QOnnaturalitas appetentis ad id quod tendet 
quae dici potest §mor natural1s."33 Therefore, the appetituB 
naturalis must be this love of nature for God. Now irrational 
creatures are driven by their own bias rather than act for 
themselves34 but the natural love in all things is caused by an 
outside intelligence not existing in natural things but in Him 
Who oreates them~5 Since intelligence rules the destinies of 
lower orders it is really through the intellect of created beinl 
that the irrational approaches the Divine Intelligence. Hence, 
it is in the mind of man that the natural tendency towards God 
sees the light of consciousness, and it is the human intellect 
that gives meaning and imparts perfection to nature, bringing 
it from the potency of intelligibility to the actuality of 
being known~6 
g~s. Theol., I-II, q.26, a.l 
35S.C.G. IV, 55 
368. Theol. I-II, q.27, a.2, ad 3 
QIMahony, opus clt., pp.l02,103 
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Since, as has been shown, God draws creatures toward 
Himself as the Object of th~ir desire, and since the natural 
appetite is the very love of God, we can say with Dante that 
all beings seek their ends "by that Love impelled that moves 
the sun in heaven and all the stars." 
v. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to modern theor1es of real1ty St. Thomas ex-
pla1ns the universe by h1s doctr1ne of finality. God 1s the 
F1rst Cause and F1nal End of all things. Be1ngs w1th and w1th-
out knowledge work toward def1n1te ends, str1v1ng always to 
fulf111 the1r own perfection and thus atta1n the divine 11ke-
ness. 
St. Thomas sees being as a h1erarchy from matter up 
to God, with all creatures des1r1ng H1m through the1r proper 
appet1te. The appet1tus natura11s alone is un1versal. It 1s 
inherent 1n all created be1ng. It is the very love wh1ch 1m-
pels every nature to seek 1ts end, and as such a love, 1t 1s 
the intrins1c cause of the harmony and regular1ty 1n the un1-
verse. Hence, the Thom1st1c concept of the operations in na-
ture 1s markedly purpos1ve, postulat1ng God as the Beginning 
and the End of everyth1ng. 
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